Disclosure and determinants studies have been extensively carried out in past accounting research. However, they have one major methodological drawback: the disclosure analysis in these studies is often limited to the determination of the disclosure index, i.e. the sum of disclosed items, weighted or unweighted. The disclosure profile (which reflects the structure of published information) is generally not used in the research design. The objective of this paper is to introduce a divisive (descendant) clustering method which splits the sample into homogeneous sub-groups corresponding to disclosure patterns (or profiles), for clearer determination of the financial characteristics of each group. This methodology is illustrated by a study of disclosure on provisions by large French firms. The results show that the disclosure pattern is related to provision intensity, size, leverage, profit and market expectation, but not to return and industry. This new research method is a valuable complement to expand on disclosure and determinants studies, moving from disclosure levels to disclosure patterns.
Introduction
Accounting disclosure and determinants analysis is a major issue in accounting research (see the abundant literature reviewed in the next section). Researchers try to answer two major questions: (1) What attitude do firms take towards accounting disclosure, either general or specific (e.g. disclosure on business segments, R&D activities, environmental protects, social responsibility, etc.)? (2) Why do some firms disclose more (or less) than others? The first research question is known as disclosure level evaluation and the second one as disclosure determinants analysis.
The most common method used in the literature consists of calculating a firm-based disclosure score and then running a multivariate linear regression, with this score as dependent variable, and various characteristics (financial or otherwise) of the related firm (firm size, leverage, financial performance, industry, listing status, audit firm size, etc.) as independent variables.
However, there are several limitations to this methodological approach. (1) The disclosure index is often determined by totaling several items. These items can be weighted or unweighted; many papers mention this issue but there is no one dominant practice. (2) The more independent variables the model contains, the more interesting it will be and the easier it will be to find explanations of a particular disclosure behavior. However, the inclusion of too many variables may create a multicollinearity difficulty (Wallace et al., 1994) . Several solutions have been proposed, including the regression of several separate models based on a selection of independent variables or a factor analysis of all independent variables (Bah and Dumontier, 2001) . (3) The form of the relationship between dependent and independent variables is not always known (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Cooke, 1998) . A "classical" linear regression cannot systematically be the most suitable tool, and rank regression may appear an appropriate solution. These three limitations have been discussed in the literature to a greater or lesser extent. However, by aggregating the different disclosure items into one disclosure index, all the existing studies retain only the quantity of disclosure (or the disclosure level).
The firms' disclosure patterns and preferences are totally lost in the analysis, although the information is present in the data collected.
The main objective of this paper is thus to propose a new methodological approach to analyze firm's disclosure practices and their determinants. Besides the traditional way of analyzing the disclosure level and its determinants as described above, we introduce a DIV (divisive clustering method) analysis to understand the different disclosure patterns. We then explore the determinants of each disclosure pattern.
This method is illustrated with data on the disclosure of information on provisions collected by analyzing the 2001 annual reports of French listed industrial and commercial firms belonging to the SBF 120 index.
Although the results of the classical linear regression are rather weak, they are improved using the rank regression. However, the most interesting results are produced by the DIV analysis. We find that the disclosure pattern is related to provision intensity, size, leverage, profit and market expectation, but not to return and industry. We also find that the group which discloses the greatest amount of information has the highest proportion of provisions, size, leverage, profit and market expectation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review on voluntary disclosure, disclosure adequacy and their determinants and discusses the methodological issues. Section 3 lays out the hypotheses. Section 4 explains our sample and data collection. Section 5 discusses our research design. Section 6 presents the empirical findings, and section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature review and methodological issues
Principle of disclosure studies Healy and Palepu (2001) , and a discussion by Core (2001) , provide a broad overview of the empirical disclosure literature. More specifically, many researchers have been interested in the corporate characteristics that could predict the disclosure level of a firm. We summarize the abundant literature in Appendix 1; the reader can also refer to Ahmed and Courtis (1999) who published a meta-analysis of 29 disclosure studies. The fact is that many firms exceed the disclosure requirements by providing information not required by the existing law or accounting standards (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1999) . This increasing transparency is supposed to help reduce the firm's agency and political costs. For example, in his study, Raffournier (1995) tried to explain the voluntary disclosure level of Swiss firms by their size, share listing, profitability, ownership structure, use of external financing, size of auditing firm, internationality and industry type. In a literature review on firms' voluntary disclosure decisions, Healy and Palepu (2001) analyze managers' reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital markets setting. They argue that six forces affect managers' disclosure decisions for capital market reasons: capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock compensation, litigation, proprietary costs, and management talent signaling.
Not all the papers concentrate on a general disclosure level. Several analyze more specific types of information: interim reporting (Leftwich et al., 1981) , segment information (Mitchell et al., 1995; Aitken et al., 1997; Prencipe, 2004) , communication on R&D (Entwistle, 1999) , and ratio disclosure (Watson et al., 2002) . The link between corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior has also been investigated (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) as well as the relation between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002 ).
Overview of methodological issues
As mentioned in the introduction, several methodological issues have been raised, often independently, by the numerous researchers interested in disclosure studies. Figure 1 summarizes the different issues identified in the past literature.
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Determination of the disclosure index
The vast majority of disclosure studies adopt an item-based approach with a dichotomous procedure in which an item scores one if it is disclosed and zero otherwise. A few articles use a different approach: e.g. number of words used to describe an item disclosed (Copeland and Fredericks, 1968) or a content analysis based on the number of sentences (Entwistle, 1999; Williams, 1999) .
In the most common approach, the concept of "disclosure index" was first used by Buzby (1975, p. 27) and Stanga (1976, p. 48) and formalized by Cooke (1989b; 1989a) . We can summarize the determination of the index as follows: The index is a ratio comparing the actual level of disclosure and the possible level (thus not penalizing the firm for the items not relevant to it).
Although there is a general consensus on the determination of this index (see Appendix 1 for the numerous studies referring to the Cooke index), a debate has arisen concerning item weighting. Cooke (1989b; 1991; 1992; 1993) , followed by numerous authors (e.g., Tai et al., 1990; Ahmed, 1994; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Archambault and Archambault, 2003) , are in favor of unweighted items, implying that each item is of equal importance. The major argument is that "one class of user will attach different weights to an item … than another class" and that "the subjective weights of user groups will average each other out" (Cooke, 1989b, p. 115) .
Conversely, other authors prefer to apply weighting to the different items. As Ahmed and Nichols (1994, p. 68 ) point out, the weighting factors may be predetermined subjectively (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971) or be taken from prior studies (Barrett, 1977) . Finally, some authors stress that certain items are more important to users than others, and send a list of items (questionnaire) to some users, asking them to evaluate the importance of each item (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976; Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Giner, 1997) . Marston and Shrives (1991) provide a review of the literature that has made use of the disclosure index as a measurement technique, while Coy, Tower, and Dixon (1993, p. 123) compare the index construction methods used by different researchers. Finally, Ahmed and Courtis (1999, p. 36) write that the approach based on unweighted items "has become the norm in annual report studies" because it reduces subjectivity.
Independent variables and multicollinearity
For improved explanations of the disclosure index, the researcher may be tempted to increase the number of independent variables, i.e. determinants. However, this decision may strengthen the potential collinearity between the variables (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Moore and Buzby, 1972) , which could be identified by running a correlation matrix. Another symptom of collinearity could be the reversal of the signs of the coefficients on some variables between the correlation matrix and regression equations (Wallace et al., 1994, p. 49) .
Collinearity can also be diagnosed by evaluating the VIF (variance inflation factor) for each variable (Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . The VIF measures the degree to which each explanatory variable is explained by the other explanatory variables. Traditionally, collinearity is not considered to be a problem when the VIF does not exceed 10 (Neter et al., 1983 ).
Several solutions have been put forward in past studies to solve this multicollinearity issue. First, different regression models are run, each routine using only one of the independent variables identified as generating a multicollinearity problem, in particular size variables (Cooke, 1989b; Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1991; Ahmed, 1994; Depoers, 2000) .
Another solution consists of factoring the collinear independent variables and using the principal factors as regressors (Cooke, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003) .
Relationship between dependent and independent variables
The multiple linear regression method has been used extensively to link the disclosure level to the financial (size, leverage, profitability, etc.) and non-financial (industry, listing status, audit firm size, etc.) variables. However, the method can be applied only if several conditions are met:
-The variables have a normal distribution; -The error term has a normal distribution with a mean of zero. The variance of the error term is constant across cases and independent of the variables in the model; -The value of the error term for a given case is independent of the values of the variables in the model and of the values of the error term for other cases; -There is no multicollinearity among independent variables.
In order to verify the fundamental assumption of normality, several tests can be conducted: skewness, kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov. But even if the results of these tests are positive, a major difficulty has been identified: the "theoretically correct form of the relation between [the disclosure index] and the independent firm variables is not known" (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p. 261) . In other words, the linearity is only an assumption.
These authors suggest using rank regressions to analyze data, citing Iman and Conover (1979, p. 508) who write that "rank regressions are quite powerful when the relations are nonlinear but monotonic". In practice, it is necessary to transform both independent and dependent variables into ranks before applying the OLS regression (Wallace et al., 1994, p. 47; Wallace and Naser, 1995) .
Following Lang and Lundholm (1993) , a few authors have applied the rank regression in the context of disclosure studies (Wallace et al., 1994, p. 47; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998) . Some have even used both procedures (with unranked and ranked data) in order to compare the results (Wallace and Naser, 1995) .
Independently of the issue of the nature of the relationship between dependent and independent variables, several authors have used the stepwise procedure (Malone et al., 1993; Ahmed, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Giner, 1997; Depoers, 2000) . As explained by Cooke (1991) , one way to specify the regression model correctly is to adopt this stepwise procedure, which adds variables to the model to maximize R² or equivalently minimize the error sum of squares. This approach is useful in determining those variables which should be included in the model. Given all the methodological issues surrounding regression analysis, Cooke (1998) reviews a number of transformations of data, including the rank regression.
Hypotheses
After surveying the various methodological issues inherent to disclosure studies, we will introduce a new method in section 5. This method will be illustrated with a study of disclosure on provisions in France. A provision, defined as a liability of uncertain timing or amount (IASC, 1998) , is calculated to face general risks or potential losses not linked directly to asset items. For example, French firms record provisions for restructuring, foreign exchange losses, litigations, etc. Pension liabilities are also recorded as provisions in France.
Our hypotheses concerning the determinants of firms' provision disclosure level cover the following characteristics of the firm: provision intensity, size, leverage, profitability, performance, market expectation for the firm's future growth, and industry type.
Provision intensity
The positive link between the relative proportion of provisions and their disclosure level is a rational consequence of application of the materiality principle. When provisions are equivalent to a high percentage of total assets, they become a major factor in evaluating the firm's risk level.
Our first hypothesis is:
H1: The extent of disclosure on provisions is positively related with the firm's provision intensity.
Size
The literature is in agreement on the positive relationship between the firm's size and its information disclosure level. There are at least three reasons for this link. First of all, large firms are more willing to disclose information to reduce their political costs, since their higher visibility can easily lead to more litigations and governmental intervention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Bujaki and Richardson, 1997) . Secondly, thanks to their more developed internal reporting system, the costs associated with a higher disclosure level are lower for large firms. Thirdly, smaller firms are more likely to hide crucial information because of their competitive disadvantage within their industry (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979) .
Appendix 1 provides numerous examples of disclosure studies which identify size as a significant determinant (e.g., Stanga, 1976; McNally et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Tai et al., 1990; Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Marston and Robson, 1997; Depoers, 2000) .
Our second hypothesis is thus the following:
H2: The extent of disclosure on provisions is positively related with the firm's size.
Leverage
Corporate information disclosure is often considered as an instrument to reduce the monitoring costs for creditors. We can thus expect a positive link between a firm's disclosure level and its indebtedness, since in the case of high leverage, creditors will urge the firm to disclose more information so they can better handle their own credit risk (Hossain et al., 1994) . For example, some studies show that diversified firms obtaining long-term capital externally were more likely to disclose segmental financial data voluntarily (Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980) . We expect this relationship to be more visible in our case, since provisions are widely suspected of being an earnings management tool. Disclosure level is therefore very precious information to help creditors correctly evaluate the risk.
Our third hypothesis is:
H3: The extent of disclosure on provisions is positively related with the firm's leverage.
Profit and return
Profit and return have also been considered as relevant explanatory variables for the disclosure level (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Wallace and Naser, 1995) . We thus expect a positive relationship between a firm's provision disclosure level and its profitability (Giner, 1997) . In their paper, Singhvi and Desai (1971) propose that when the rate of return is high, managers are motivated to disclose detailed information in order to support the continuance of their positions and remuneration. Conversely, when the rate of return is low, they may disclose less information in order to conceal the reasons for losses or declining profits.
We thus arrive at the two following hypotheses:
H4: The extent of disclosure on provisions is positively related with the firm's level of profit.
H5: The extent of disclosure on provisions is positively related with the firm's rate of return.
Market expectation for the firm's future growth
One of the major roles of financial information disclosure is to reduce agency conflicts and to minimize the firm's capital cost by resolving the information asymmetry problem between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Therefore, a higher provision disclosure level should be associated with a better market expectation for the firm's future growth.
Our sixth hypothesis is:
H6: The extent of disclosure on provisions is positively related with the market expectation
for the firm's future growth.
Industry type
Several studies have highlighted a relationship between the disclosure level and the industry sector (Cooke, 1992; Raffournier, 1995) . Conversely, several arguments can be put forward to show the evidence to date is inconclusive (Watson et al., 2002) .
Our hypothesis No. 7 is:
H7: The extent of disclosure on provisions is not related with the industry.
Sample and data collection
Sample
Our statistical survey concerning the disclosure of provisions is based on a sample of large French groups included in the SBF 120 stock index for the year 2001. This choice allowed us to work on a sufficiently large sample and to carry out a relevant survey covering major sectors of the French economy. It is important to note that only industrial, commercial and service sectors are included in the survey; banks, insurance and such sectors as leasing companies are excluded because they use sector-specific accounting principles and their financial statements are not comparable to those of other economic sectors. We also decided to exclude the stockbroking company Euronext. Our research covers only one year because firms' disclosure policies appear to remain relatively constant over time (Botosan, 1997, p. 
327)
A few more companies are excluded from the sample due to the absence of published consolidated financial statements or notes to the financial statements, or because there were no associated data in the Worldscope database. In conclusion, 100 industrial and commercial French listed companies belonging to the SBF 120 Index are included in our study (see Table   1 and the list of the firms in Appendix 2).
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Data collection and explanatory variables
To explore the provision disclosure pattern and level, we analyzed the 2001 annual reports of the 100 firms included in our sample. Fourteen information items are studied (see the list in Appendix 3). Some items are not strictly speaking information disclosures (e.g. items 13 and 14 which depend on certain conditions being met). The coexistence of items scored on a "yes/no" basis and conditional items has already been observed (Barrett, 1976; Marston and Robson, 1997) . We use a dichotomous procedure in which an item (or a condition) scores one if it is disclosed (or met), which reflects the firm's effort in terms of transparency and accurateness of information, and zero otherwise. These dummy variables not only define the mapping of each firm regarding its provision disclosure structure, but also give us an aggregated vision of firms' general provision disclosure level.
In comparison to many other disclosure studies (see Appendix 1), the number of items is limited. This results from the scope of the study, which concentrates on a single topic:
provisions and is consistent with past literature. (e.g., Prencipe, 2004 , in the field of segment information).
We then extract the financial data for our sample from the annual reports or from the Thomson Analytics' Worldscope Database. The analyzed variables, which constitute proxies for our hypotheses, are described in table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here Past research has used various classifications to group firms by category: conglomerate, manufacturing, services, trading (Cooke, 1991) ; 1. metals, building materials and construction, 2. engineering, 3. consumer goods and services, 4. oil, chemicals and mining (Meek et al., 1995) ; manufacturing, non-manufacturing (Cooke, 1992; Raffournier, 1995) ; basic industry, manufacturing industry, service industry (Giner, 1997); 1. electronics and technology, 2. publishing and printing, 3. food and beverage, 4. shipping and transportation (Chau and Gray, 2002) . We have adopted a more detailed division into nine sectors: automobile, building, consumer goods, energy, food, health, industry, media and technology.
Research design
In a preceding section, we discussed the numerous methodological issues surrounding disclosure studies. In order to avoid problems described, we adopt a research design comprising two steps (see figure 2) . Firstly, we run a linear regression, with unranked then ranked data in order to test the relationship between the disclosure level and the different determinants. Secondly, we use the DIV method to identify the information items that determine a firm's provision disclosure pattern and to classify firms under different clusters according to pattern. On the basis of this clustering, we will test our hypotheses by analyzing the differences between our clusters' financial characteristics based on their provision disclosure pattern.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Disclosure index
We decided to adopt an unweighted index, treating all items equally, given that there is no specific set of users of information on provisions (Cooke, 1989b) . The index is the ratio of the total score awarded to a company divided by the maximum possible score that company could obtain.
Linear regression
The limits of linear regression have been discussed above. We will use two of the methods mentioned: the OLS regression and the rank OLS regression, and check for multicollinearity by computing the VIF (variance inflation factors).
DIV analysis
The regression method cannot reflect the structure of provision disclosure. We can expect divergences between firms concerning the types of provision information. For example, some companies prefer to disclose information related to the treatment of the provisions, while others like to inform users about a particular type of provision (e.g. for restructuring). This structural information cannot be reflected in the general provision disclosure level. Therefore the regression will reduce the richness of our study.
In order to cope with this difficulty, we introduce the DIV method, a divisive clustering method. It simultaneously defines a hierarchy of a set of objects and a monothetic characterization of each cluster of the hierarchy (Chavent, 1998) . It is similar to a segmentation method, and starts with all objects in one group, dividing each group successively into smaller ones. DIV is also a monothetic clustering method. A cluster is called monothetic if a conjunction of logical properties is both necessary and sufficient for membership in the cluster (Sneath and Sokal, 1973) . At each stage, bipartition is performed by a single variable and a specified value of the variable in monothetic clustering. The DIV analysis is a descendant hierarchical clustering method (Chavent et al., 1999) . It is very different from the hierarchical clustering analysis found in statistical software (e.g., SPSS) and already used in past research (Stolowy and Tenenhaus, 1998; Sucher et al., 1999) . While this second method is an ascendant hierarchical clustering, the DIV is descendant, as already stated. Consequently, the major advantage of DIV analysis is that it explains the origin of the clustering by determining the items which separate the companies into groups.
DIV was developed in the framework of symbolic data analysis. It is also applied in standard data analysis (see Appendix 4 for details). DIV analysis was carried out using SODAS. The "SODAS" software tool was developed jointly by 17 European teams (sponsored by EUROSTAT) and is available free of charge. It facilitates the use of analysis techniques for numeric or symbolic data, and can be used in particular for data of a complex structure, to provide better explanations of statistical results, and to represent, manipulate or better analyze concepts and metadata. As mentioned above, disclosure level study results in the existing literature are often limited to the aggregated final disclosure score. The DIV method gives us the possibility to break through this limitation. Here, we will explore the provision disclosure structure of each firm. This clustering method will classify the firm sample into several groups according to their provision disclosure patterns (which information they emphasize and which information they neglect). The criteria used for classification will also be very important information: the presence or absence of one specific information item can predict the disclosure pattern of a firm.
Determinants analysis between different groups
The usual way of analyzing the link between a firm's provision disclosure level and its financial characteristics is the linear regression method. For the reasons described above, we will add the statistical method, measuring the differences in financial characteristics between groups of firms classified according to their provision disclosure patterns. We will use either parametric or non-parametric tests depending on the distribution patterns of the financial characteristics.
Results
Regression model
The regression model below is applied, first with unranked data, then with ranked data (following Wallace and Naser, 1995) . We define the model excluding the "Food" sector (which has the lowest Provisions/Total assets ratio of the nine sectors). In a linear regression, a categorical variable (i.e. one which can take several values, e.g. the business sector) should be split between a number of dummy variables equal to the number of possible values minus one. The excluded value (here the food industry) serves as a reference for the other dummy variables and this procedure will avoid perfect collinearity. high and significant correlations). As expected, disclosure increases with the proportion of provisions over total assets (variable significant at the 0.05 level). This result is logical: we would expect a firm to disclose more information if the proportion of provisions is higher. But it is still interesting because, in an R&D context, Ding and Stolowy (2003) found no relationship in France between R&D intensity and the total amount of information reported on R&D. All other variables are non-significant.
Regression with unranked data
As a sensitivity test, we reran the regression excluding Industry, which does not appear to be a significant explanatory variable. The results remain unchanged (adjusted R² = 0.111).
Insert Table 3 about here
Regression with ranked data
Given that the Index variable does not have a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) and that there is uncertainty over the nature of the relationship, we transformed both independent and dependent continuous variables into ranks before applying the OLS regression (with the instruction Transform/Rank cases/Rank of SPSS). As in Lang and Lundholm (1993) , firms with tied ranks were assigned the average of the ranks they would have had if they had not been tied. Results are provided in panel B of Table 3 . They are more significant (sig. F = 0.019) and the adjusted R² is 0.136. While the Provisions/Total assets variable is even more significant (p=0.001), profit also appears to be significant (at the 0.10 level). As a sensitivity test, we reran the regression excluding Industry. The results remain unchanged (adjusted R² = 0.179).
Disclosure pattern
Based on the disclosed information items, we used the Divisive Clustering method to classify our sample. The number of clusters can be defined a priori. Table 4 below shows the descriptive statistics of these three firm groups, stating the percentages of firms in each group disclosing the related item. For example, item 2 is disclosed by 100% of firms in group 2, and by no firms in groups 1 and 3. As far as the disclosure level is concerned, Table 4 also shows that firms in group 2 disclose the highest quantity of information on their provisions, followed by group 3 and group 1.
Insert Table 4 about here
Determinants analysis between different groups
Because the distribution of the explanatory variables is not normal (as shown by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality), it is necessary to consider using the nonparametric procedures designed to test for the significance of the difference between groups. These procedures are called nonparametric because they make no assumptions about the parameters of a distribution, nor do they assume that any particular distribution is being used (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) . One popular nonparametric test for independent samples greater than two is the Kruskal Wallis test. Table 5 shows the mean rank per group, for each variable, and the results from the Kruskal Wallis test for differences between Groups 1, 2 and 3.
Insert Table 5 about here Table 5 shows that most of our hypotheses are validated regarding the pattern (or profile) of disclosure. Based on the disclosure pattern, as identified with the DIV method, the firms of the three groups differ in: the ratio of provisions to total assets (at the 0.05 level), size (at the 0.10 level), leverage (at the 0.05 level), profit (at the 0.01 level) and market expectation (at the 0.01 level).
But the results for the "index" variable also indicate a very significant difference between groups (at the 0.01 level). Firms in group 2 disclose more information. Looking at the mean rank for the other variables, we find another interesting result, which provides some support to our original hypotheses: firms in group 2 (which disclose the highest number of information items) have the highest provision intensity, the largest size, the highest leverage, the highest profit and highest market expectation.
Conclusion
This study looks at the disclosure pattern for information related to provisions reported by large French listed industrial and commercial firms. The firms' financial characteristics linked to this disclosure pattern are also studied.
By investigating the annual reports of 2001 for 100 French firms belonging to the SBF 120 Stock Index, we found that the disclosure pattern is associated with provision intensity, size, leverage, profit and market expectation. Our study also shows that firms with the highest score for disclosures have the highest provision intensity, firm size, leverage, profit, and market expectation.
The objective of this paper was to make two contributions to the literature. Firstly, this study used an innovative statistical approach to analyze firm's disclosure patterns and levels.
Secondly, it performed the first empirical exploration in the field of disclosure on provisions and the relationship between a firm's provision disclosure and its financial characteristics, and so enriches the existing literature, especially as regards voluntary disclosure issues. Appendix 3. List of the 14 surveyed items 1. Inclusion in the "accounting principles" part of the notes to the financial statements (the "notes" in the rest of this paper) of a specific note on the treatment of provisions (excluding pension liabilities). 2. Inclusion in the notes of the description of a particular type of provision (e.g., section on the provisions for restructuring, for repair works, etc.). 3. Inclusion in the notes of a piece of information describing the methods for computation of provisions. (e.g. statistical determination of a given provision). 4. Inclusion in the "accounting principles" note of a note on the treatment of pension liabilities. 5. Reference in the notes concerning pension liabilities to the accounting standard applied (IAS 19, FAS 87,  French regulation 99-02). 6. Inclusion in the notes concerning pension liabilities of details of the computation of provisions. (One point has been attributed when the notes disclosed such information as statistical data on the population, discount rate, amount of funded pension liability, etc.). 7. Disclosure in the "Equity and liabilities" side of the balance sheet of a specific line "Provisions". (We have attributed a 0 when the company reported a heading such as "Other long-term debts" covering provisions and other debts). 8. Disclosure in the balance sheet of a Year X1/Year X0 comparison. 9. Disclosure in the balance sheet of a Year X1/Year X0/Year X-1 comparison. (The disclosure of the two preceding years' figures will become compulsory in 2005 with implementation of the IFRS. All companies which have already incorporated this change were attributed one point). 10. Inclusion in the notes of a statement of changes in provisions (increases, decreases, etc). 11. Breakdown given of the item "Other" (provisions) allowing for restatement and distribution of this item between the other major provisions. One point has been attributed when the company disclosed quantified information. 12. Distinction between short-term and long-term provisions in the notes. 13. Disclosure of specific lines of provisions. If there is only a breakdown between "risks" and "expenses", a 0 is given. If more lines (with a threshold of 5) are disclosed, a 1 is given. 14. Amount relating to "other provisions" lower than the average for the 96 companies. The importance of the "other" line is a major factor in the transparency of financial information disclosed by the company. The higher it is (measured relatively to the size = assets of the firm), the greater the possibilities of accounts manipulation are. We have transformed this complex variable into a dummy variable, specifying that all companies with an "other" lower than the sample average would be attributed one point, and the rest 0.
Appendix 4. DIV Analysis Method explained
In order to separate objects with DIV, a within-cluster variance criterion is defined. Let N be the number of objects in set Ω. All objects are described on p real value variables by vector
). The weights are usually equal to 1 in classic data analysis.
A within-cluster variance of a cluster C k is given by:
x is the centroid of the cluster C k ,
The variance criterion of K-partition C=(C 1 ,…,C K ) is given by:
This criterion is minimized among bipartitions induced by a set of binary questions. Let C i be a set of n i objects. The goal is to find the bipartition ) , ( 
is equivalent to choosing the cluster so that the difference between the within-cluster variance of i C and the within-cluster variance of its bipartition ) , (
is maximum. Thus, the criterion for selecting the cluster to split is given by: The divisions are stopped after a number L of iterations and L is given as input by the user.
The last partition obtained in the last iteration is an L + 1-clusters-partition. The stopping rule ensures that the partitions of smallest within-cluster variance of the total hierarchy are obtained after L iterations. However, this stopping rule does not solve the issue of determining the number of clusters in the dataset (Milligan and Cooper, 1985) .
The output of this divisive clustering method is a hierarchy H whose singletons are the L+1
clusters of the partition obtained in the last iteration of the algorithm. Each cluster
there will be no inversions in the dendogram of the hierarchy. This hierarchy is also a decision tree. The L clusters are the leaves and the nodes are the binary questions selected by the algorithm. Each cluster is characterized by a rule defined according to the binary questions leading from the root to the corresponding leaves. Decision node 1
